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NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
COMMENTS AND OPINIONS
Contracts-Infants--Flying Course as a Necessary-Disaffirmance.[Massachusetts] This is an action of contract to recover $1600 paid to the
defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was a minor when the contract
was entered into. The trial judge, finding in behalf of the plaintiff filed. the
following:'
The Court found the following facts:
"This is an action of contract to recover the sum of sixteen hundred
(1600) dollars and interest paid to the defendant under contracts made
during the infancy, of the plaintiff. The writ is dated July 11, 1931, returnable the second Saturday in August, 1931, with an ad damnum bf three
thousand (3000) dollars.
I find the facts to be substantially as follows:
The plaintiff, a minor, entered into a contract with the defendant, the
Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., for instruction as a private pilot, on
September 25, 1929. The cost of the course was three hundred (300) dollars,
and the same was completed and paid for. On February 27, 1930, the plaintiff
entered into a contract with the defendant for a course of instruction as a
limited commercial pilot, the cost of the course being thirteen hundred (1300)
dollars. The course was completed and paid for. On May 6, 1930, the
plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant for a course of instruction as a transport pilot, the cost of the course being thirty-two hundred (3200)
dollars. This course was not completed and no amount was paid on account
of the cost of the same. At the time these contracts were signed, the plaintiff
was a minor. The plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from the transport pilot's
course in May, .1930, and attained his majority on July 20, 1930. On February 28, 1931, after receiving a notice that he owed a balance of forty-eight
-dollars and fifty-five cents ($48.55) on account of the instruction received
under the third contract, he visited the office of the attorney for the defendant at New Bedford, Mass., and stated that he did not owe any money
to the defendant. He did not disaffirm his contracts until July 11, 1931, when
he brought the present action. The plaintiff is the son of a textile weaver
employed at New Bedford, Mass. He went to work at the age of sixteen,
as a plumber's helper. Later, he worked in an auto garage, earning on an
average of twenty (20) dollars per week, and later did some laboring work
at twenty-two (22) dollars per week. He left New York in the early part
of 1929, and went to work for Carpen Brothers as an upholsterer, earning
on an average of twenty-four (24) dollars per week. He left this job to
take the course of flying instruction from the defendant. At this time, his
folks had accumulated two thousand (2000) dollars, and he, himself, had
accumulated four hundred (400) dollars. He took-the course 'because he
wanted to learn a new trade and earn a good living.' The plaintiff failed
to qualify as a private pilot, or as a limited commercial pilot, although he had
taken examinations for same. He has been unable to obtain work in any
commercial flying service as a result of having taken this course.
It is agreed by counsel for the parties hereto that the law of the State
of New York is applicable in this case.
I find that the plaintiff was a minor at the time the contracts were made;
that he was a minor at the time of the execution of the first and second
contracts and at the time that he left the school in May, 1930; during his
1. See 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 291
District Court.
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instruction under the third contract. I find that he disaffirmed his contracts
and that the disaffirmance was within a reasonable time after attaining his
majority. I further find that the courses of instruction were not necessaries
for the plaintiff.
I rule that under the law of the State of New. York, the plaintiff having
received from the defendant only an intangible right, in the nature of flying
school instruction, is not chargeable for the benefit, if any, received from
such instruction. International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188;
Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 553; Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578; Wyatt v.
Lortscher, 216 N. Y. Supp. 571; McCarthy v. Bowling Green Storage Co,
169 N. Y. Supp. 463.
Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of twenty-one hundred sixty-three
dollars ($2163)."
The case is to be decided according to the law of New York. The three
contentions made before us are(1) Did the course of instruction constitute necessaries for the plaintiff?
(2) Has the plaintiff a right to rescind this contract as an executed
contract?
(3) If the plaintiff has the right to rescind did he do so within a reasonable time after reaching his majority?
(1) As to the contract being one of necessaries. It was said in International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 195, "what are necessaries
depends on circumstances to some extent and frequently involves a question
of fact. .

.

. The word necessaries as used in the law is a relative term,

except when applied to such things as are obviously requisite for the maintenance of existence and depends on the social position and situation in life
of the infant as well as upon his own fortune and that of his parents. What
would be necessary in a legal sense for an infant with ample means of his
own might not be so for one with no means at all. .

.

. A proper education

is necessary but what is a proper education depends on circumstances. A
common school education is doubtless necessary in this country, because it is
essential to the transaction of business and the adequate discharge of civil
and political duties. A classical or professional education, however, has
been held not to come within the term (case cited). Still circumstances
not found in the cases cited may exist where even such an education might
properly be found a necessary as a matter of fact."
There it was held that a course of instruction in complete steam engineering with five years in which to finish it, was held not a necessary because of lack of evidence as to facts bearing on the question of its necessity.
As to a course of electrical instruction and relying upon International Text
Book Co. v. Connelly, supra, see Crandall v. Coyne Electrical School, 256
Ill. App. 322.
The defendant relies upon Curtiss v. Roosevelt Aviation School, Inc.,2
1934 U. S. Aviation Reports, 135.. This was a municipal'court case before
a single justice, in which it was declared that a contract for instructions in
an aviation school to prepare an infant student as a mechanic is a contract
for necessaries. The sole sentence on this point in the opinion reads, "It is
my view that the course of study sought was to secure mechanical knowledge
to equip plaintiff for a job in that line and should be classified as a necessary."
There are no citations supplementing that statement and evidently the words
'2. See Comment, 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 275 (1935).

NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
of the justice are to be construed as a finding of fact rather than as a ruling
of law. The course of instruction in the case at bar cannot be said, as matter
of law, to be a necessary.
(2) As to the plaintiff's right to rescind an executed contract. In the
nature of things, the contract being instruction given by the defendant to
the plaintiff, there can be no return of the consideration received by the
plaintiff.
In Wyatt v. Lortscher, 217 App. Div. (N. Y.) 224, it is said at page 226,
"Contracts of infants, except for necessaries, although not void, are voidable
at the will of the infant (cases cited). The infant himself may elect to
disaffirm a contract within a reasonable time after becoming of age even
though the contract has been fully executed. . . . (P. 227.) Disaffirmance,
however, carries with it a reciprocal obligation of returning considerations
received for the obligation disaffirmed. It would be inequitable to allow
an infant to avoid obligations on his part and at the same time retain the
benefits which continue to enrich him (cases cited). He is not required at
all hazards, however, to restore the other party to the contract to the position
he was in when the contract was made. If, for example, the infant has
squandered some part of the property he has received, or even all of it, he
may, nevertheless, disaffirm the contract and get back what he himself gave,
giving back only what he continued to hold (cases cited). Were this not
so, in many cases the result would be to hold the infant to his contract, which
would be contrary to the considerate policy of the law toward those not yet
of age." See also Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 533, Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578,
McCarthy v. Bowling Green Storage -Co., 169 N. Y. Supp. 463, cited by the
trial judge in his memorandum.
If one is not obliged to put the other party in statu quo with reference
to as much of the consideration as the minor may have squandered, there
is no reason for saying that he is precluded from disaffirming because the
nature of the consideration is such that inherently it cannot be restored to
the other party. To allow otherwise would be indirectly to give full force
to a contract made with the minor whenever the other party had received
consideration for something intangible. The defendant suggests a difference exists between tangibles and intangibles. But that difference does not
seem to have as yet been intimated in the decisions of New York. The contract of the minor in the case at bar is one which is subject to disaffirmance
by the minor.
(3) We are of the opinion, however, that there was error in giving
the plaintiff's tenth request and in denying the defendant's fifth request:
The facts found by the court are that (1) the plaintiff "attained his
majority on July 20, 1930," (2) on February 28, 1931, after receiving a notice
that he owed a balance of $48.55 . . . he visited the office of the attorney
for the defendant "and said he owed nothing," (3) He did not disaffirm
his contracts until July 11, 1931, when he brought the present action.
In Welch v. King, 279 Mass. 455 at page 450, Chief Justice Rugg stated the
general rule. It is "that, since the privilege of disaffirmance belongs to the
minor alone and cannot be exercised by the other party to the contract, it
must be exercised within a reasonable time having regard to all the circumstances." See also Darlington v. Hamilton Bank of New-York,.63 Misc. 289,
and Aldrich v. Funk, 1 N. Y. Supp. 543.

-
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That failure to disaffirm an executed contract within a reasonable time
operates as a ratification. See Parsons v. Teller, 188 N. Y. 318 at 326, and
Washington Street Garage v. Malloy, 230 A. D. 266 at 267.
The plaintiff, citing Welch v. King, supra, says that the law of New York
is the same as that of Massachusetts with respect to ratification of infants
contracts. He relies on the language in Welch v. King, in which it is said
"no occasion has hitherto arisen for the defendant to declare herself in confirmation or repudiation." But the court in that case further said, "It would
have been a dumb show for the defendant to undertake repudiation of the
clause before anyone could have anticipated that it would ever be operative."
The facts in that case are quite different from those in the case at bar.
Here the contracts which the plaintiff now seeks to disaffirm had long since
been executed. Seven months after the plaintiff reached the age of twentyone years the defendant notified him that it claimed he owed it a balance due,
and only when the defendant brought suit for the alleged balance due did
the plaintiff disaffirm.
This was practically one year after he became of legal age. It was
five months after the demand by the defendant on him.
We are of the opinion that as a matter of law the plaintiff did not disaffirm the contracts within a reasonable time after attaining his majority
and that under all the circumstances his failure to disaffirm constitutes a
ratification thereof.
See Lown v. Spoon, 158 A. D 900.
It is, therefore, ordered that the finding of the trial court be reversed,
and finding entered for the defendant.3
Negligence-Carriers-Alleged Injury of Passenger Due to Transportation in Rough Weather-Sufficiency of Evidence for Jury.- [Federal]
On March 17th, 1936, trial of an unique and interesting case was had in
Eleanor M. Hope v. United Air Lines, Inc., United States District Court for
the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, at Kansas City,
Missouri. The novelty of the case lies in the fact that the plaintiff was
attempting to recover solely because of alleged negligence of defendant airline in transporting her in rough weather, there being no crash, collision, or
damage to plane or other passengers.1 The case was not reported, and it
has therefore been deemed advisable to set out here a rather full abstract
2
of the testimony, with excerpts from the charge to the jury.
Plaintiff alleged that she had been permanently injured by the negligent
operation of a plane of the defendant in which she was a passenger being
3. The opinion of ESTES, J.,is set out in full. The decision of the Appellate
Division of District Courts, Southern District, Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
in the case of John P. Adamowski v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., was
handed down during the latter part of December, 1936. No date appears on
the decision, copy of which was furnished through the courtesy of Mr. Cyril
Hyde Condon of Wherry, Condon & Forsgyth of New York City, New York,
counsel for defendant.

1. The only case on record in the United States involving even incidentally
the alleged negligence of an air carrier for rough passage is Casteel v. American
Airlines, Inc., 88 S. W. (2d) 976 (1935) where, however, the case turned upon
entirely different issues. See 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 288 (1936).
2. The case, which aroused a great deal of interest at the time of the
trial, was fully covered by the local newspapers.
See the Kansas City Star,
page 1, March 16, 1936; page 1, March 17, 1936; Kansas City Times, March 17,
1936; Kansas City Times, page 1, March 18, 1936; Kansas City Journal-Post
(Home Edition), March 16, 1936; Kansas City Journal-Post, March 17, 1936.
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transported from Chicago to Kansas City on September 2, 1934; and she
prayed for $25,000 damages for her injuries. She alleged that the pilot negligently precipitated the plane into a violent windstorm and caused the
plaintiff to be violently thrown against various parts of the interior of the
plane, whereby she sustained injuries.
To sustain this theory of the case, the plaintiff testified that as she was
about to board the plane at Chicago there was in progress at Chicago a torrential rain and windstorm; that in Chicago she asked the co-pilot if it was
safe to fly in such a storm and he assured her that it was because they would
fly above the storm; that, in reliance upon his statement that the plane would
fly above the storm and that it was perfectly safe to fly, she boarded the
plane and it took off without mishap, rose to an altitude of 9500 feet and
flew above the storm as far as a point which she believed was Kirksville,
Missouri; that the trip from Chicago to the point of intermediate landing
had been delightful, a really beautiful trip; that the plane landed at this
intermediate point and the pilot told her the reason for the landing was
that he had "run out of gas." Plaintiff testified that it was still raining at
Kirksville, Missouri, when the pilot again took off, but that from Kirksville
to Kansas City he did not fly above the storm. Instead, plaintiff said, he
flew right into the storm and when the plane was fifteen or twenty minutes
out of Kirksville it ran into "dreadful air pockets" and was tossed up and
down and back and forth; that the. plaintiff was strapped in her seat which
had been reclined by the stewardess and she was helplessly tossed hither
and yon in the plane against various parts of the interior thereof for about
an hour; that she screamed for help time and time again but the stewardess
did not come to her aid and neither did either of the other two passengers,
who were in the rear of the plane behind the plaintiff; that as the plane
neared Kansas City the storm abated and the landing at Kansas City was
made in a normal manner when, for the first tiiiie, the stewardess came to the
plaintiff who was unable to get out of her seat and the stewardess helped her
to disembark. Plaintiff was met by friends who assisted her to the automobile and she was taken to her hotel, put to bed and a doctor was called.
Plaintiff produced six lay witnesses and two medical witnesses to substantiate her testimony as to injuries.. One of the medical witnesses was
the hotel physician, and the other was a person who described himself as an
osteopath with training in medicine and a specialist in the X-ray.
At the close of the plaintiff's testimony the defendant moved for a
directed verdict, but the court overruled the motion "with reservations."
The theory of the defense was that there had been no negligent operation of the plane on the day in question, and that the plane had not been
precipitated into a violent windstorm, and that the injuries, if any, sustained
by the plaintiff were sustained while the plane was attempting to land at
Kansas City airport where there had been a mild wind shift just at the
time the plane was about to approach.Kansas City, and these injuries, if
any, were caused by known hazards of the air for which the defendant
was not responsible.
Defendant introduced the testimony of the co-pilot, stewardess, pilot and
assistant auditor of the United Air Lines, and a meteorologist from the Kansas
City airport, and established by the testimony of the crew that there was no
torrential rain or windstorm in Chicago at the time in question; that the
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plaintiff did not talk to the co-pilot in Chicago and that he did not tell her
that it was safe to fly and that the plane would fly above the storm and he
had no conversation with her whatever; that the plane did not stop at
Kirksville, Missouri, but at Burlington, Iowa; that the pilot did not say
that he had run out of gas; that he had not run out of gas but on the
contrary had 165 gallons of gas at the time he landed at Burlington to refuel
simply as a safety measure due to headwinds; that from Burlington to
Kansas City there was so little out of the the ordinary about the weather
conditions that the trip made no particular impression on the crew; but when
the ship was descending preparatory to landing at Kansas City there was
a mild wind shift over the Kansas City airport whiGh created a turbulent
air condition and the air was rough when approaching 'the airport; that the
pilot circled the airport to ascertain the dominant wind direction and then
landed into the wind in a perfect landing.
In regard to plaintiff's testimony as to the hour that she was tossed
about in the violent windstorm between Burlington and Kansas City, the
stewardess testified that as a matter of fact during about one-third of that
time from Burlington to Kansas City she was seated next to the plaintiff
and visited with her discussing clothes, books, poetry, travel and other subjects, and that there was no storm and that the plaintiff made no complaint
about any injury or any storm. At about 10 minutes before the plane landed
at Kansas City the stewardess had checked the safety belts of all the passengers including that of the plaintiff and at that time the plaintiff made
no complaint of any injury or any storm or any roughness; that after the
landing in Kansas City the plaintiff did complain to the stewardess about
having caught her foot under the foot rest 'and hurting-her ankle during
the descent into Kansas City.
The assistant auditor identified certain records which confirmed the
testimony of the crew in regard to the time of the flight, the stop at Burlington, the amount of gas on hand at Burlington and the amount of gas used
between Burlington and Kansas City. The meteorologist confirmed the testimony of the crew that the records of the airport showed that the flying
conditions were good until about 3 minutes before the plane landed in Kansas
City when the records showed that there was a mild wind shift reported
over the airport.
The Court in overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict stated
that in his opinion the testimony of the plaintiff had created as issue of
fact for the jury as to whether the pilot had negligently precipitated the
plane into the violent windstorm as described by the plaintiff. The following
excerpts from the Court's charge to the jury are given :3
Reeves, J.: * * * "Briefly, as to the issues in the case, it appears from
undisputed evidence that the defendant was operating an airplane line or
an airship between Chicago and Kansas City on the 2nd day of September,
1934; and there is no controversy in the case but that the plaintiff became
a passenger on that ship at Chicago and traveled on it to Kansas City. The
testimony is in like manner undisputed that the ship left Chicago approximately five twenty-five o'clock in the afternoon, and that it arrived in Kansas
City at eight forty-five o'clock. It is also established without controversy
that the plane descended at an intermediate point. There was some little
question as to whether it was at Kirksville, or a landing field near Kirksville,
3. General instructions have been omitted.
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or at Burlington, Iowa, where the plane landed. I take it that upon the
proofs in the case there is no controversy now but that the plane descended
at Burlington, Iowa, which is an intermediate point between Chicago and
Kansas City. There is also without controversy evidence that the trip from
Chicago to the field at Burlington, Iowa, to the airport there was without
incident. In other words, there is no question as to the travel over that
portion of the trip but that the plane flew probably above what was referred
to as the 'over-cast,' or in the language we may more clearly understand,
.above the clouds, a smooth trip, and that the plane came down, as I said,
at Burlington, Iowa.
. "There is some evidence that the plane descended-I believe there is
no controversy but that it did descend for the purpose of taking on more
fuel, gasoline and probably oil, for its use in continuing its journey on to
Kansas City.
"The plaintiff in her petition states that after they left Burlington, Iowa,
and were somewhere over Missouri, those in control of the plane carelessly and negligently precipitated the plane into a violent windstorm, and
that she was violently thrown in the interior of the plane against various
parts of the plane, and that she was severely shocked and jarred, and that
she suffered injuries by reason of what she says was the negligent and careless act of the defendant in thus precipitating the ship into a windstorm,
so that she has suffered multiple injuries, and she says she has continued
to suffer from such injuries and that she was totally disabled as the result
of bruises and twists to her body.
"The defendant on its part denies all these averments and says that if
plaintiff did suffer any injuries on that trip it was such injuries as come as
a natural consequence, as the usual hazards attendant upon travel by air.
"That makes the issue that you gentlemen are called upon after hearing
the testimony in the case, to decide. There are a few preliminary instructions
that I shall give you. In the first place, the burden in the case is upon the
plaintiff to prove the allegations of her petition by a preponderance of the
testimony. By preponderance of the testimony I do not mean necessarily
the greater number of witnesses, but I do mean the testimony that seems to
you the more reasonable or more probable and the more satisfying to your
minds. If the testimony should be evenly balanced, then the plaintjff would
not be entitled to a verdict, to recover. In other words, according to the
averments of the petition the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant carelessly and negligently through its operating agents precipitated
the airship into a violent windstorm, and that on the trip from Kirksville
or Burlington, Iowa, to Kansas City this was done, and as a result thereof
she was violently thrown from side to side in the cabin of the ship and
against various parts of the plane, and she was severely jarred and shaken,
and that she suffered serious physical injuries as the result. If the tetimony
should be evenly balanced as to whether or not the defendant carelessly and
negligently precipitated the plane into a violent windstorm, or if it should
be evenly balanced as to whether she was caused in such fashion to be thrown
against parts of the plane so as to suffer injury, then it would be the duty
of the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. If she has carried the
burden and proved these things, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
"The only way a jury can know the facts of a lawsuit is from the testimony in the case. Naturally, the testimony comes, in this case particularly,
from oral testimony of witnesses, so it is the right of the jury, since you are
the triers of the facts in the case, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. The law has said that you are the sole judges of the credibility of
the witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to the testimony of each and
every witness who testified in the case. In determining what weight and
what credence you should give to the testimony of any witness who may
have testified-you should take into consideration and account the conduct
and demeanor of the witness on the witness stand, his interest in the case
or in the results of the case, if any, his bias or his prejudice for or against
either of the litigants in the case, his opportunity to know and understand
the things about which he gave his testimony, the reasonableness or unrea-
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sonableness of the testimony of such witness, and the probability or improbability of the facts occurring or existing as testified by such witness.
"Gentlemen, the parties have asked me to give certain instructi6ns. They
are my instructions, not those of counsel, of course. I am giving them to
you as the law of the case:
"The Court charges the jury that while defendant cannot be held accountable for the weather conditions, it was its duty as a common carrier of
passengers, to so conduct and operate its airplane as not to subject its passengers to hazards that could be avoided by the use of the facilities available
and the exercise of human foresight.
"If you find that on September 2, 1934, the plaintiff was a passenger
upon an airplane operated by the defendant between Chicago, Illinois, and
Kansas City, Missouri, and on that question I will say you will be entirely
justified in finding that she was a passenger on the plane because there is no
controversy on that; and if you should further find that during the course
of said passage the said airplane was conducted into rough or stormy atmospheric conditions, and that as a result thereof, if you so find, the plaintiff
was injured by being shaken, jarred, or thrown against parts of the interior
of said airplane, and, if you further find, that said injuries, if any, would
have been avoided by exercise of the highest degree of care on the part of
the defendant in the operation of said airplane, then your verdict will be
for the plaintiff. By 'highest degree of care' I mean that degree of care
which a very careful and prudent person would have used under like or
similar circumstances.
"The defendant is required to use the highest degree of care and diligence
for the safe carriage of its passengers, but it is not required to use such
skill as will free the transportation of passengers from all possible peril.
"The plaintiff necessarily took upon herself all the usual and ordinary
perils incident to airplane travel and if you find that defendant used all the
care, skill, and diligence required by law as above defined and that nevertheless an accident occurred, the defendant would not be responsible therefor,
and your verdict should be for the, defendant. The defendant is not an
insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not bound absolutely and in all
events to carry them safely and without injury. All passengers take the risk
of those dangers which cannot be averted by the exercise of the degree of
care which the law requires.
"Negligence is never presumed, but the burden is upon the plaintiff to
prove such negligence by a preponderance of the evidence as I have defined it
to you, and further to prove that such negligence on the part of 'the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury. On both of these issues the
burden is upon the plaintiff, and unless the plaintiff proves such negligence,
and that it was the proximate cause of the injury, there can be no recovery
herein and the verdict must be for the defendant and against the plaintiff.
"A defendant is not liable for an injury which is not caused by its
negligence but which results from some natural agency over which it has
no control.
"If you should find that the pilot acted in such a manner as a person
of prudence and caution and skill would use under the same circumstances,
then he was not negligent.
"One riding in an airplane assumes the risk that sudden and unavoidable
storms and weather conditions may be encountered and that the plane of
necessity must be brought from the sky to the earth under conditions of
weather that involve unusual risk and danger in landing.
"I am not going to comment upon the testimony of the witnesses, but I
am going to call your attention to the names of the witnesses and some
of the things concerning which such witness gave testimony.
"Mrs. Hope was the first witness in the case. You gentlemen will remember Mrs. Hope, the plaintiff in the case, and what she said about her
trip from Chicago, what she said her conversation was with the pilot at
Chicago, either the pilot or the co-pilot, the conversation with some official of
the company there, and also her conversation at that point where the plane
descended, Burlington, Iowa, and the reason for its descent at that point.
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I believe there is no controversy on that point. The pilot testified he descended for the purpose of refueling his ship. You gentlemen have before
you the amount of fuel on hind and the amount ordinarily consumed in
the course of the trip, at fifty to six gallons per hour regardless of weather
conditions.
"Mr. Edgar Courtway testified for the plaintiff. He was the clerk at
the'Bellerive Hotel where Mrs. Hope was living at the time. She went to
the Bellerive from the airport. The clerk assisted her, he said, to her room.
"Margaret Graham was the maid at the Bellerive. She said that she was
called by Mr. Courtway, that she went to the room of Mrs. Hope and
aided her in undressing, took her shoes off, and she testified as to what she
observed as to the condition of her body, as to the bruised condition of her
body.
"Dr. Shapiro was called as a witness. Dr. Schoen was also called as a
witness. He was also an attending physician. He told you what he observed.
Mr. and Mrs. Hundley were friends from Belton. They came in to call on
the plaintiff and told you gentlemen the condition in which they found her.
June Dawson was her personal maid who waited on her and looked after
her, attended to her dressing and undressing. She told you gentlemen what
she observed. 'Mrs. Thomas L. Bowles was in the automobile which met the
plaintiff the night of her arrival from Chicago. She said she received a
telegram from her. She told you what she observed. Mr. Schmidt was
the assistant meteorologist at the airport. It was his duty to keep the
records of weather conditions from time to time and report such conditions,
and he reported the conditions as his records showed them to be, both here
and at Kirksville, as I recall. Mr. Cochrane was sworn as a witness and my
recollection is that the matter he sought to identify was excluded by the
Court, so I just speak about it. There was nothing Mr. Cochrane said to
which I need call your attention.
"For the defendant Mr. Lyman testified. Mr. Lyman was the co-pilot or
assistant pilot. I do not believe that was the term used. He was the
assistant to Mr. Rockwood, he testified. He testified to leaving Chicago and
of attending to the refueling of the ship at Burlington, Iowa, of what he
observed of the weather conditions, and the conversation, if any, that he
had with the plaintiff in Chicago. He' said he had no conversation with
her at the landing field at Burlington, Iowa.
"Mrs. Stineman testified. She said she was the stewardess on the airplane, that she went to Chicago that day and back on the same ship, making
the round trip that afternoon. She told you gentlemen about meeting and
talking with the plaintiff, that she was in the cabin with her, and served lunch
on the trip from Chicago to Burlington, Iowa, where they descended, and she
said they had conversations. She told you about the plaintiff's condition
when they reached Kansas City, that is, she told you what she said, what
she thought the condition was.
"Mr. Rockwood was the pilot in charge. He told you about his conversation with the plaintiff. At Burlington, Iowa, he went back into the cabin to
talk with her, but he did not recall all that was said. He testified as to
weather conditions, as did Mr. Lyman, and the point where they say they
actually met a windshift. Mr. Rockwood said it was not unusually serious
and that he circled the field and brought his ship to what he described as a
fine landing.
"Mr. Ellert was the auditor who kept records of the movement of ships
between Chicago and Kansas City. He recorded, and it was offered in
evidence, the record he made of the time schedule of this ship from the time
it left the airport in Chicago to the time it arrived in Kansas City, and he
gave you the time it arrived and left Burlington, Iowa, which he said was
seven minutes past seven, the amount of gas that was taken on at Burlington, the amount of gas in the ship when it left Chicago, etc.
"Mr. Warren was the meteorologist at Kansas City and the airport. He
made records of weather conditions and he testified to you gentlemen as to
what the weather conditions were at various times.
"Now, gentlemen, so much for the testimony.
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"If your verdict in this case should be for the plaintiff, then it shall be
your duty to allow her sucl sum of money as you honestly feel would reasonably compensate her for the damages alleged to have been sustained by
her on this trip on this airship. Such compensation would be for her pain
and suffering, both physical and mental, for such pain and suffering as she
may have endured in the past, if any, and such pain and suffering as she may
sustain in the future, if any, such medical disbursements as she may have
made for medical services, or may make in the future, if any, and for her
inability and loss of ability to get around and do the work that she was
able to do beforehand, not exceeding the sum of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, which she has fixed as the maximum of her recovery. In naming that
sum, there is no implication intended that that sum or any other should be
determined by the jury. I name that for the reason that the plaintiff fixes
her maximum for damages at Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, and the jury
cannot go beyond that. If the verdict is for the plaintiff, within that sum
the jury has the right to fix whatever damages they find and believe plaintiff
sustained.
"Have you any further instructions, Mr: Madison?"
MR. MADISON: "No, Your Honor."
THE COURT: "I will allow you an exception to each of defendant's in-

structions, if you want it."
MR. MADISON: "Yes, Your Honor."
MR. MURRAY: (Out of hearing of the Jury) "Defendant excepts to that
portion of the Charge which hypothesizes the facts under which plaintiff
might recover, because, (1) the Charge does not define what conduct on
defendant's part could be found to be negligence, and (2) the Charge gives
to the Jury a roving commission to find negligence upon the part of the
defendant upon any theory the Jury might evolve, whether within the issues
and the evidence or not.
THE COURT: "Gentlemen of the Jury, when you go to the jury-room you
should elect one of your number as your foreman to preside over your deliberations. You should bear in mind that it requires the judgment of all
of your number, the concurring judgment of all of your number to return a
verdict in this court. Jurors sometimes might be confused with the law in
our State courts. In our State courts nine men of a jury of twelve men
may return a verdict. That is not the law in this court. It takes all the
twelve men to return a verdict in this court.
"If your verdict in this case should be for the plaintiff, then you will use
this form which the clerk has provided for your use:
We, the jury in the above entitled cause, find the issues herein in favor of
the plaintiff Eleanor M. Hope and against the defendant United Air
Lines, Incorporated, a Corporation, and assess the amount of plaintiff's
damages in the sum of $ ..............
and you will find a blank space wherein you will insert the amount of that
recovery, and then your foreman will sign.
"If your verdict should 'be for the defendant in this case you will use
this form:
'We, the jury in the above entitled cause, find the issues herein in favor
of the defendant United Air Lines, Incorporated, a Corporation, and
against the plaintiff Eleanor M. Hope,
and in like case your foreman will sign in the blank space above the word
'Foreman'.
"Gentlemen, you will retire with an officer of the court to your jury room,
and when you have reached a verdict let that fact be made known to an
officer of the court and I will receive it."
(Thereupon the jury retired to consider of its verdict.)
(Very shortly after retiring, the jury was by the Court recalled to the
court room:)
THE COURT: "Gentlemen of the Jury, I am sorry to have to call you
back. In reading some instructions to you, I inadvertently omitted to read
a very short instruction. I deem it encumbent upon me to do it, so I called
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you back very briefly to give you this brief instruction to the effect that if
you find and believe from the evidence that the injuries of plaintiff, if any,
were received while the plane was coming to earth at the Kansas City airport, then I charge you that there is no evidence of negligent operation of
the plane at that time and place and your verdict will be for the defendant.
That is all. I thank you very much."
After deliberating for one hour and fifty minutes, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendant. No appeal was taken.
Negligence-Carriers-Alleged Injury of Passenger Due to Transportation in Rough Weather-Sufficiency of Evidence for Jury.-[Federal] Plaintiff boarded defendant's airplane at Chicago for transportation on
a regularly scheduled trip to Kansas City. When the trip was about halfway
completed, an unscheduled stop was made at an intermediate field for
refueling. Plaintiff alleged that some time after resuming flight, turbulent
air conditions were encountered which caused the plane to be severely tossed
about, whereby she was injured. For these injuries she sues, alleging negligent handling of the airplane. Plaintiff adduces no expert testimony concerning the piloting of airplanes, their present day performance, nor the
science of meeting turbulent air conditions. None of the other passengers
was called as a witness. The defendant, whose testimony denied that of the
plaintiff at every point, moved for a directed verdict; but the court ruled
that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine the question of negligence. Held: verdict and judgment for defendant. Eleanor M.
Hope v. United Air Lines, Inc. (W. D. Mo. March 17, 1936, Case No. 9247).1
The court's decision to present this case to the jury raises a new issue
in the law of passenger carriers of the air, i.e., whether evidence of such
injurious occurrences during flight as extreme roughness of passage makes
out a prima facie case of negligence. The ruling is an application of the
so-called mild form of res ipsa loquitur.2 Both in the mild form, and in the
so-called severe form, res ipsa loquitur has appeared in air law, but until the
present in no case except where the injuries complained of occurred in a
crash.3 It may be observed that in the field of personal injuries in trans1. See statement of facts and excerpts from the charge to the jury at
page 132.
2. Res ipsa loquitur is found in three applications. In its mild form it
serves merely to provide sufficient evidence to carry before a jury a case which
would otherwise result in a directed verdict for the defendant. In the so-called
severe form it has the force of a full presumption and 'will determine the case
for the plaintiff If not overcome by defendant's evidence. 5 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d ed. 1923) p2509.
Intermediate these situations, the doctrine shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant; but, after he has introduced evidence, the
plaintiff.
The prereoulsites warranting the use of the
burden reverts to the
doctrine are the same in any of the three applications. Carpenter, "The Doctrine
The mild form has
of Res Ipsa Loquitur." 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 519 (1933).
for years been the prevailing rule of the federal courts.
3. Employed in the mild form in: Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways
Inc., 242 App. Div. 625 (1934), aff'g N. Y. Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co. (1933), 1934
U. S. Av. R. 21 (unexplained crash of passenger carrier into high tension
Doctrine emwires)
see Genero v. Ewing, 28 P. (2d) 116 (Wash. 1934).
ployed in the severe form in: Stoll v. Curtiss Flying Service, 236 App. Div.
664. 257 N. Y. S. 1010 (1932), aff'g N. Y. Sup. Ct., N. Y. County (1930), 1930
U. S. Av. Rep. 148 (crash resulting from bank at low altitude); Seaman V.
Curtiss Plying Service, Inc., 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N. Y. S. 251 (unexplained
crash); Smith v. O'Donnell, 5 P. (2d) 690, aff'd 215 Cal. 714, 12 P. (2d) 933
39 P.
(1932) (collision of two planes) : Parker v. Granger, Cal. Dec. -;
52 P. (2d) 226 (1936) (collision) ; Goodheart v. American
(2d) 833; - Cal. -;
Airlines, Inc. (N. Y., Nassau Co.) 1936 U. S. Av. R. 179 (unexplained crash).
Wtilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N. E. 212 (1932)
refuses to apply the doctrine "because It is not In the normal course of flying
that motors should be Immune to failure for more than a few minutes." And
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portation the doctrine is invoked most readily against the common carrier,
the more easily as the type of vehicle involved reaches the stage of mechanical
perfection and where the accident is to the vehicle itself, injuring its parts
or impairing its normal operation.
In the. law of railroads, nearly a century older than that of airplanes,
res ipsa loquitur was formerly employed only in severe accidents, overturns,
collisions, and smash-ups.4 Though some jurisdictions still limit the use
of the doctrine to such cases,5 recently, under modern operating conditions,
the doctrine has been employed in aid of sufferers from severe jerks occurring
7
6
during passage on trains, and on the modern motor buses.
Like the airplane, the ship at sea cannot, even by the most prudent handling, avoid every injurious occurrence that comes with the winds; and
although a prima "Vacie case is made against the sea carrier when personal
injuries occur in collisions,8 founderings,9 accidents at the wharves,' 0 when
storm warnings have been broadcast," or certain equipment is lacking,' 2 or
there has been failure to warn the passenger,' 3 res ipsa loquitur is not applied
4
when the accident is caused by the elements.'
Surely the air is as uncontrollable as the sea. By analogy, res ipsa
loquitur does not properly apply in the present case. Any suggestion or
reasonable inference of negligence is overcome by the fact that under the
conditions of present-day flight, the operations of airplanes would not be
Flerndon v. Gregory, 81 S. W. (2d)

849. 851 (Ark. 1935)

(crash of private

plane) argues against the use of res ipsa loquitur altogether in cases of an
unexplained crash of an airplane (strong dissent).
4. First employment in the federal courts was In Stokes v. Saltonstall,
38 U. S. 181 (1839)
(overturn of stage coach); applied to the railroads In
Railroad Co. v. Pollard, 89 U. S. 341 (1874) ; Gleeson v. Virginia Midland Railroad Co., 140 U. S. 435 (1891) ; see Patton v. Texas and Pacific R. Rt. Co., 179
U. S. 659, 663 (1901).
5. Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Fotheringham, 17 Colo. App. 410, 68 Pac. 978
(1902)
Nelson v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 25 App. Div. 535, 50 N. Y. S. 63
(1898)
Delaney v. Buffalo R. Rt. Co., 266 Pa. 122, 109 A. 605 (1920) ; Norfolk
Western R. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 109 Va. 176, 63 S. E. 445 (1909).
6. Capitol Traction Co. v. Lyon, 24 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A, D. C. 1928)
Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Byrne, 60 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 3rd 1932)
Gibson V. Southern Pae. R. R. Co., 67 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 5th 1933). Contra:
Norfolk A Western R. R. Co. v. Birchett, 252 Fed. 512 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918)
(earlier holding).
Meeks v. Graysonia, Nashville A Ashdon ft. R. Co., 168
Ark. 966, 272 S. W. 360 (1925); McIntosh v. Los Angeles R. R. Corp., 59 P.
(2d) 959 (Cal. 1936); O'Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 242 I1. 336, 89 N.
E. 1005 (1909) ; Heinecke v. Chicago City R. R. Co., 279 III. 210, 116 N. E. 761
(1917) ; Paul v. St. Louis Public Service Co.. 46 S. W. (2d) 911 (Mo. 1932)
Burr v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 64 N. J. L. 30. 44 AtI. 845 (1899).
7. Seney V. Pickwick Stages, Northern Division, 268 P. 451 (Cal. 1928)
IToppe v. Boulevard Transport Co., 172 Minn. 516, 215 N. W. 852 (127)t;
Seinner v. Public Service Coordinated Transport Co., 151 Atl. 624, (N. J. 1930);
McLaughlin v. United Transportation Co., 57 P. (2d) 868 (Okla. 1936) ; Cumberland and We.ternport Transport Co. v. Metz, 158 Md. 424, 149 Atl. 4 (1930) ;
Roy v. United Electric R. R. Co.. 164 AtI. 513 (R. I. 1923). Contra: Quinn v.
Colonial Motor Coach Corp., 266 N. Y. 584, 195 N. E. 211 (1934).
8. Duggan v. New Jersey d. W. Perry Co., 23 Del. 318, 76 Atl 636 (1909).
9. The Jane Grey, 99 Fed. 582 (N. D. Wash. 1900).
10. Inland S. Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551 (1890).
11. The Arabic, 50 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
12. North German Lloyd S. S. Co. v. Roehl, 144 S. W. 322 (Tex. 1912).
13. Boston X. Yarmouth S. S. Co., Ltd. v. Francis, 249 Fed. 450 (C. C. A.
1st 1918).
14. Morgan v. Oceanic Navigation Co., Limited, 224 N. Y. S. 420 (1927).
Due to the circumstance that practically all cases on this point are in admiralty,
tried without a jury, opinions stating the inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur
are extremely hard to find. But the type of language used in the following opinIons, In admiralty, leaves little doubt that In a civil trial the court by employment of the doctrine would give judgment for the defendant without reference
to the jury. See The Great Northern. 251 Fed. 826 (C. C. A. 9th 1918) ; Winnepeg, 5 F. Supp. 469 (N. D. Cal. 1933) ; Carlsen v. A. Paladini, Inc., 5 F. (2d)
389 (C. C. A. 9th 1925) : Stiles v. Munson S. S. Co., 40 F. (2d) 276 (E. D. N.
Y. 1930) ; Silverman v, Bermuda, 74 F (0d) 683, 684 (C. C. A. 1st 1935).
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entirely free of the sort of incident complained of, even though the highest
degree of care is employed. While in the future man may be able to counteract air currents, the aviation industry of today, at any rate, is sufficiently
remote from this goal that courts, in developing air law, may well guide
themselves by the rules that are employed in cases of personal injuries
caused at sea by elements still uncontrollable. In the field of injuries in the
air, holdings similar to the present would throw the stripling air traffic upon
the mercy of juries, by rules which are now applied to railroads after a
century of their improvement. Although meteorology and the science of
weather reporting are constantly improving and developing along with aviation,
the air transport of today cannot, while in flight, be notified of every cross
current or wind shift, nor infallibly avoid it when forewarned, nor may
schedules be dissolved by every overcast sky.15
RIcHARD SHELDON.*

DIGESTS
Insurance-Double Liability-Construction of "Engaging as a Passenger or Otherwise in Aeronautic Expeditions" Exclusion Clause.[Federal] The United States Supreme Court, on October 12, 1936, denied the
petition of The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States for
a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit (83 F.
(2d) 147). The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v.
Iva A. Day, 57 S. Ct. 11 (U. S. Supreme Court, October 12, 1936).
For a digest of the case see 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 420 (1936).
Negligence

-

Collision

-

Insufficient Allegation of Agency.

-

[New

York] In an action for damages arising out of a collision between the
plaintiff's airplane with that of the defendant as both were about to land,
the complaint alleged that the defendant's plane was being operated by one
Donahue with the consent and permission of the defendant, and that the
collision was caused solely by Donahue's negligence. On motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, held: complaint dismissed, with leave to plaintiff to serve an amended complaint within ten days.
There were no allegations that Donahue was operating the defendant's airplane as his agent, servant or employee, or in the defendant's business and
within the scope of his employment. None will be inferred from the allegation that the defendant was the owner of and in control of the airplane.
An allegation that Donahue was operating the vehicle with defendant's consent and permission would be sufficient to charge the latter in a case arising
out of an automobile collision on a public highway under §59 of the Vehicle
and Traffic law, but the statute is not applicable here. Consequently the
common law rule governs, by which it is settled in New York that the owner
of a vehicle will not be held liable for negligence of its operator unless
at the time it was being used in the owner's business by the operator within
the scope of his employment. Munch & Romeo, Inc. v. Caton, 96 N. Y. L. J.
876, 235 C. C. H. 1213 (County Court, Nassau County, New York, Sept. 25,
1936).
15.

Percentage of scheduled flights completed by the air transport com-

panies of the United States:
1931

...................................... 93.61%

1932.........................................95.56%
1933 . ....................................... 95.55%
1934 ....................................... 93.88%
1935
................................
95.18%

7 Air Commerce Bulletin 282 (1936), Bureau of Air Commerce, Washington,
D.C.
* Northwestern University Law School.
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Taxation-Situs of Seaplanes.-[California]
Three seaplanes of X
Airways Company, registered in New York, operate out of Alameda Airport,
City of Alameda, California, in interstate and foreign commerce exclusively.
No regular schedule is maintained, but the planes leave every ten days to
two weeks for a round trip. The company, a New York Corporation, is
not qualified to do business in California. The city and county seek to tax
the planes as personalty situate within their jurisdictions. Held: such seaplanes are subject to taxation by the City of Alameda and the County of
Alameda, California. They cannot be considered as vessels exempt from
taxation within the meaning of Article XIII, §4, of the California State
Constitution which provides that "all vessels of more than fifty (50) tons
burden registered at any port in this state and engaged in the transportation
of freight or passengers shall be exempt from taxation except for state
purposes, until and including the first day of January, 1955." The fact that
the property is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce does not render
it immune from a non-disCriminatory property tax by the state having jurisdiction. Registry of a vessel within the state is not necessary to confer
such jurisdiction, and the seaplanes are taxable if they have an actual situs
in the state of California. Using the base supplied by the rolling stock
cases the average number of the planes habitually used and employed in
the state will be subjected to taxation by the City of Alameda and the
County of Alameda if the county assessor finds that on the average one or
more of the seaplanes is habitually at the Alameda airport. Opinion of the
Attorney General of California to the State Board of Equalization, No. 10870,
August 3, 1936.

